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Herbert Hausmaninger*

From the Soviet Committee of
Constitutional Supervision to the
Russian Constitutional Court

Introduction

In June 1988 the 19th Party Conference of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) recognized the need to develop a "Socialist state
under the rule of law"' and consequently approved the introduction of a
special institution to review and ensure the observance of constitutionality and legality in the Soviet political system. An amendment to the
Soviet Constitution, adopted on December 1, 1988, provided for the
establishment of a Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the
USSR (Komitet konstitutsionnogo nadzora SSSR).

2

The creation of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision (CCS)
* Professor of Law, Vienna (Austria); Visiting Professor of Law, Cornell Law
School; Dipl. Dolm., Dr. Jur., Graz. This Article was submitted on Feb. 21, 1991.
1. See Resolution "On Legal Reform," printedin PRAVDA and IZVESTIIA on July 5,
1988, translated in Moscow NEws, Supplement to No. 29, 1988, at 6, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, MOSNWS File.
2. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 49, item 727 (1988), translatedin 15 REV. SOCIALIST L.
No. 1, 75 at 103-115 (1989). See Herbert Hausmaninger, The Committee of Constitutional
Supervision of the USSR, 23 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 287 (1990); Matthias Hartwig, Das
KomiteeftYr Verfassungsaufsicht der UdSSR, 18 EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFr
1 (1991); Bernd Wieser, Das Komiteefftr Verfassungsaufsichtder UdSSR: Entstehung- rechtliche Grundlagen -praktische Tditigkeit, 37 OSTEUROPA RECHT No. 2, 174 (1991); Sergei S.
Alekseev, Probleme und Perspektiven eines Verfassungsgerichts in der UdSSR, 37 OSTEUROPA
RECHT No. 2, 196 (1991); Sieglinde Reinhardt, Das Gesetz iiberdie Verfassungsaufsicht im
Kontext der Umgestaltungin der UdSSR, 34 RECTrr IN OST UND WEsr No. 7, 298 (1990);
Friedrich-Christian Schroeder, Das Komiteefir Verfassungsaufsicht in der Sowjetunion, 31
JAHRBUCH FOR OSTRECHT 286, (1990); Patrice Collas, Le contr6le de constitutionnalit en
U.R.R.S., 106 REVUE DU DROrr PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLMI.UE 1035 (1990); B.
Lazarev, Garantiizakonnosti resheniivysshikh eshelonov vlasti, SOTSsAtaSnCHESKIA ZAKONNOST' No. 4, 8 (1990); L. Baranov, B. Lazarev, Yu. Reshetov, KoMMUNIST No. 4, 67
(1990); E. Kubankov, Konstitutsionnyi nadzor - opora pravovogo gosudarstva, Soy. LusT.
No. 3, 29 (1990); Yu. Shul'zhenko, Komitet konstitutsionnogo nadzora - spetsializirovannyi
organ po pravovoi okhrane Osnovnogo zakona SSSR, KONsTrrursIONNAIA REFORMA V SSSR
28 (1990); D.A. Kerimov, A.I. Ekimov, Konstitutsionnyi nadzor v SSSR, SOVETSKOE
GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO [Sov. Gos. IPRAvo] No. 9, 3 (1990); S.A. Yemel'ianov, Sootnoshenie i vzsaimodeistvie konstitutsionnogo i prokurorskogo nadzora, Sov. Gos. I PRAVo,
No.4, 3 (1991).
25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 305 (1992)
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reflected conflict between competing political and legal tendencies. 3
Some legal scholars advocated the creation of a constitutional court with
power to nullify unconstitutional legislation and other illegal enactments. Others considered this idea either premature or outright
counterproductive prior to the adoption of a new Soviet Constitution
and a new framework of national relations in the Soviet Union. The
parliamentary majority opted for a committee of constitutional supervision with mostly advisory and suspensive powers. This choice was supposedly compatible with both the prevailing notion of parliamentary
supremacy and emerging assertions of republic sovereignty, yet would
enable the CCS to contribute to the development of rule of law. This
political compromise formula, however, turned out to handicap seriously the Committee's effectiveness.
Part I of this Article will attempt to assess the legal impact of the
Committee and evaluate the quality of its "findings." Part II will focus
on the Russian Constitutional Court, which was shaped by Russian legislators in response to the perceived weakness of Soviet constitutional
supervision. The Court, which was elected on October 29, 1991, issued
its first opinion on January 14, 1992. The decision gives rise to hopes
that a "third power" is emerging in the Russian Federation and will
assert constitutionality with the legal force and political courage necessary to promote a pervasive legal culture.
I.

The Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR

A.

Election

On December 23, 1989, approximately half a year after an abortive initial attempt, 4 the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union
resumed legislative work on constitutional supervision. The Congress
revised the new article 125 of the Constitution, 5 passed the Law on Con3. See Hausmaninger, supra note 2, at 287-298.

4. See id. at 291-293.
5. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 574 (1989). Text also in IZVESTIIA, Dec. 26,
1989, at 3, translated in CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS, Apr. 4, 1990, at 16. Art. 125 was

modified and renumbered 124 in connection with the establishment of the office of
President of the USSR on March 14, 1990. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 12, item 189
(1990), Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On Establishing the Post of President
and Making Changes in andAdditions to the USSR Constitution, translated in CURRENT DIG.
Soy. PRESS, May 9, 1990, at 20; F.J. M. Feldbrugge, The Constitution of the USSR, 16
REv. Soc. L. No. 2, 163 at 205 (1990). Terminological changes were introduced into
art. 124 by the Constitutional Amendments of Dec. 26, 1990. Vedomosti SSSR, No.
1, item 3 (1991). In point four of art. 124 "Council of Ministers" was changed into
"Cabinet of Ministers"; in point five the terminology was changed from "Council of

Ministers," "Committee of People's Control" and "Chief State Arbitrator" to "Cabinet of Ministers," "Control Chamber" and "Supreme Arbitration Court," respectively; in point eight the words "or the Council of Ministers" were replaced by "to
the President of the USSR, to the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR" See The Law on
Changes in the Constitution, CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS, Mar. 27, 1991, at 21.
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stitutional Supervision in the USSR, 6 and elected the Chairman (Professor Sergei S. Alekseev) and the Deputy Chairman (Professor Boris M.
Lazarev) of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision. 7 Since the
Congress ran out of time on December 23 to elect the twenty-five members of the CCS, the Congress resolved that they were to be elected at
the following session of the Supreme Soviet.8 The constitutionality of
this resolution was highly questionable because the Constitution
the Congress9 and did not envisexpressly assigned this competency to
10
organs.
other
to
age the delegation
On April 26, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union elected,
without discussion, nineteen members of the CCS." t Although there
were supposed to be twenty-five members, the three Baltic republics
refused to cooperate, and no complete agreement existed as to the four
members who were to come from autonomous territorial formations
within the USSR. 12 In the meantime, other candidates, originally
selected for membership, had accepted other positions. For example,
went home to head
the designated member from Kazakhstan reportedly
8
his republic's constitutional supervision organ.'
Under the Constitution, members of the CCS were to be "special6. The Law on Constitutional Supervision, Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 572
(1989); Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on ConstitutionalReview in the USSR,
IZVESTIIA, Dec. 26, 1989, at 1, translatedin CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Apr. 4, 1990, at
13 [hereinafter Law on ConstitutionalReview]. The Law was not amended to reflect the
constitutional amendments of March 14 and December 26, 1990.
7. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 575, sec. 1 (1989). Concerning the electoral
process, see Hausmaninger, supra note 2, at 315-316.
8. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 575, sec. 2 (1989).
9. KONST. SSSR art. 108, reprinted in 16 REV. Soc. L. No. 2, at 196 (1990).
"Within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR
are... (9) the election of the Committee of Constitutional Supervision of the USSR
on the recommendation of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet." Id. "The
Supreme Soviet of the USSR:... (20) decides other questions assigned to the jurisdiction of the USSR, with the exception of those which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the'Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR." Id. art. 113.
10. Hausmaninger, supra note 2, at 315-6; see also Wieser, supra note 2, at 181. On
the issue of delegation of competencies, see also the CCS finding ofJune 27, 1991,
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 856 (1991), and see infra note 83.
11. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 18, item 314 (1990), Election of Members of the USSR ConstitutionalReview Committee, translatedin CURRENT DIG. SOV.PRESS, May 30, 1990, at 29.
At the same time, Chairman Alekseev's deputy status was terminated according to
art. 25 of the Law on Constitutional Supervision. See Vedomosti SSSR, No. 18, item
315 (1990). In an interview with commentator Yurii Feofanov in Izvestiia, Alekseev
pointed out that the deputies had basic information on the candidates, but that the
absence of a debate attested to a lack of awareness of the importance of these
appointments. IZVESTIA, June 17, 1990, at 2.
12. Hausmaninger, supra note 2, at 298, 314. The Buriat, Bashkir and Tatar
Autonomous Republics seem to have been "represented" on the CCS by members
Boskholov, Muksinov and Iagudin, respectively. See the interview of Committee
member Boskholov with PravdaBuriatii on the regional distribution of the four seats
reserved for autonomous formations: one to North Caucasus, one to West and East
Siberia plus the Far East, two to the Volga Lands (Povolzh'e). PRAVDA BURIATIi, Dec.
16, 1990, at 4 [hereinafter Boskholov interview].
13. Information received from Prof. Boris N. Topornin (Moscow) in July 1991.
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ists in the area of politics and law."' 14 With two exceptions, 15 all Committee members held higher law degrees; 16 most of them were law
17
professors. The Committee included one woman.
Under the March 14, 1990, Amendments to the Soviet Constitution,
the President of the USSR 18 would nominate members of the Committee. 19 The Congress of People's Deputies ultimately decided, however,
that the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, not the President, would propose Committee members for election. 20 This change was based on the
argument that the Committee would review the President's decrees, and
the Committee members should therefore not be the President's polit21
ical appointees.
As provided by an apparently unconstitutional resolution of the
Congress, 22 the members of the Committee, upon their election, drew
lots to reduce the term of office of one half of their number from ten to
five years in order to ensure staggered renewal and a measure of continuity in the future. 28 The results have not been announced. The
Committee subsequently adopted a procedural reglement, 24 which was
25
also not published.
14. KONST. SSSR art. 124, reprinted in 16 REV. Soc. L. No. 2, at 205 (1990); Law on
ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 5.
15. L. Karapetian, Prorektor of Erevan University, holds a doctorate in philosophy. See IzvEsnTiA, Apr. 26, 1990, translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, May 30,
1990, at 29. M. Annanepesov, Vice-President of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences,
has a doctorate in history. Id.
16. Including Chairman Alekseev and Deputy Chairman Lazarev, 14 of the 21
Committee members held doctorates, five held candidate degrees in law. Id.
17. Rozalia I. Ivanova, Professor of Law, Moscow State University Law School.

Id.
18. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 12, item 189 (1990), The Law Establishing a USSR PresiPRESS, May 9, 1990, at 20.
19. See Draft of Constitution, art. 123 (8), in IZVESTIIA, March 5, 1990, at 1; see also
the discussion of this draft article in the Congress of People's Deputies as reported in
IZVESTIIA, March 15, 1990, at 3, translatedin The Extraordinary Third Congress of USSR
People's Deputies, CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, May 2, 1990, at 13-14 (Professor
Kudriavtsev, Chairman of the Editorial Commission, endorsing a proposal to this
effect by the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Lukianov).
20. KONST. SSSR art. 108(11); The Law Establishinga USSR Presidency, supra note
18, at 22.
21. KONST. SSSR art. 124(2). ("[The Committee] offers findings on the conformity of decrees issued by the President of the USSR to the Constitution and laws of the
USSR.").
22. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 573, sec. 2 (1989); see Hausmaninger, supra
note 2, at 313.
23. The Committee members I interviewed inJuly 1991 (Deputy Chairman Boris
M. Lazarev, Vadim K. Sobakin and Liudvig M. Karapetian) found nothing questionable about this procedure, whereas Professor Boris N. Topornin, Director of the Institute of State and Law, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, considered it clearly
unconstitutional.
24. Law on ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 28.
25. Although I was assured that the Rules were not secret, I was not able to
obtain a copy.

deng, translatedin CURRENT DIG. SOy.
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1. Jurisdictionof the CCS
Under the Soviet Constitution and the Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR, the Committee could, either at the request of any of
several high state organs 26 or on its own initiative, 27 examine the constitutionality of laws and the legality of certain other normative acts, such
as decrees of the President and ordinances of the Council (later Cabinet)
of Ministers of the USSR. The CCS would submit its "findings" (zakliucheniia) to the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet or
other organs that had issued the respective unconstitutional or illegal
acts. The findings were published in the Soviet Legal Gazette and had advisory, suspensive or nullifying force.
The CCS was originally designed to monitor the constitutionality of
both federal and republic legislation. 28 Since the republics, notably the
Baltic states, refused to acknowledge federal jurisdiction over their legislative acts (and later claimed sovereignty, independence and supremacy
of republic over federal law), a compromise had to be reached. Thus,
the review authority of the CCS would not extend to republic law until a
new Union Treaty was passed.
Nonetheless, there was to be one very notable exception: the CCS
could immediately invalidate republic law that violated fundamental
human rights and freedoms protected by the Union Constitution and
international acts.2 9 In other cases of its jurisdiction, such as the viola-

tion of non-human rights provisions of the Soviet Constitution by a federal statute, a presidential decree, or a government ordinance, the CCS
could merely issue a finding of unconstitutionality or illegality and suspend the legislative or executive act. It thereby appealed to the respective state organ to correct the faulty normative act within a statutory
30
period of three months.

2.

Work Procedures of the CCS

Little public information exists on internal work procedures of the
CCS. According to a press interview given by Committee member
Sergei S. Boskholov 3 1 on December 16, 1990, the Committee worked in
three sections: state law, economic law, and criminal law. An interview
given by Deputy Chairman Lazarev one day later 3 2 and several subsequent interviews and articles of Chairman Alekseev fail to provide more
information on this subject.
26. KONST. SSSR art. 124; Law on ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 12.
27. Except for normative acts of the republics, see the legal provisions cited supra
note 26.
28. Hausmaninger, supra note 2, at 298.
29. KONST. SSSR art. 124; Law on ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 21.
30. Law on ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, arts. 21 and 22.
31. PRAVDA BURIATII, No. 288, Dec. 16, 1990, at 4.
32. G. Ovcharenko, Pravo na pravo, PRAVDA, Dec. 17, 1990, at 2, abridged text
translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Jan. 16, 1990, at 26.
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With the exception of a two-month summer recess in 1990, the CCS
held monthly meetings of a few days each. During these meetings, it
heard oral argument by representatives of government organs and testimony by experts on constitutional law in "open" session.3 3 After deliberating and voting in camera, the CCS publicly announced its findings.
As of its fourth session in October 1990, all of the Committee's decisions were unanimous.3 4 The published findings indicated neither
which members participated in a decision nor the members' respective
35
votes. Dissents have been few and brief
The CCS began its work in May 1990 on two floors of a building
that houses a museum devoted to the life and revolutionary activities of
Lenin's sister, Anna Ul'yanova-Yelisarova. The building, located close
to the Kremlin,3 6 appears rather inconspicuous. 3 7 This lack of physical
visibility and accessibility may be viewed as symbolizing the status the
CCS was accorded and prepared to accept.
Between its first official announcements of May 16, 1990,38 and the
decision to dissolve on December 23, 1991, a3 the CCS produced fewer
than two dozen findings. Most of these findings nullified human rights
violations by federal legislative and executive authorities. The Committee passed the majority of its findings on its own initiative. In some
instances, union organs asked the CCS to nullify human rights violations
by republic organs, which the Committee could not examine on its own
initiative. In many human rights cases, the CCS referred to international human rights pacts such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1948 and the International Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966.40 The
33. "The Committee's meetings are conducted openly ..

" Law on Constitutional

Review, supra note 6, art. 17. This provision was applied very restrictively. Hartwig,
supra note 2, at 10, n.80, and Wieser, supra note 2, at 187, n.74, report that they were
denied access to the CCS's "public" meetings.
34. Boskholov interview, supra note 12.
35. Committee members S. S. Boskholov and A. G. Bykov wrote a 12-line dissent
from the two-page finding published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1002 (1990).
See infra note 95 and accompanying text. Committee member G. Z. Intskirveli dissented from the two-and-a-half page finding in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1003
(1990) in 15 lines, infra note 98, and from the one-and-half page finding Vedomosti
SSSR, No. 26, item 741 (1991) in seven lines, infra note 101.
36. The address was 9 Manezhnaia ulitsa.
37. I heard two conflicting explanations for the absence of any sign indicating the
presence of the "guardians of constitutionality" in this unlikely environment: first,
that people would try to gain access and flood the Committee with petitions, not
knowing that it had no jurisdiction over individual constitutional complaints; second,
that the KGB also had no sign on its front door, and everybody knew exactly where to
find it!
38. See infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
39. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.
40. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), 9 U.N. GAOR
(3d Sess. pt. 1), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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Soviet Union had ratified both pacts, and the CCS insisted on their
41
supremacy and immediate applicability over Soviet law.
In an interview with Izvestiia on June 17, 1990,42 Committee Chairman Professor Alekseev made it clear from the outset that the Committee's work would focus on the protection of human rights and freedoms.
This approach was apparently designed to dispel the frequently voiced
concern of Soviet jurists and other intellectuals that the Committee's
establishment had been premature. These critics feared the CCS would
be forced to uphold an obsolete and largely discredited Brezhnev Constitution against progressive perestroika legislation.
Alekseev pointed out that some provisions of the 1977 Constitution, viewed in the context of the evolving legal infrastructure of per43
estroika, could serve as starting points for the Committee's work.
Thus, he referred to the principle of glasnost' mentioned in article 9,44
legality in article 4,45 court control over the activity of state officials in
article 58,46 and the presumption of innocence in article 160.4 7 Alekseev added that important perestroika amendments had been passed on
March 14, 1990,48 which included provisions for a multiparty system, 4 9
41. The USSR ratified both agreements in 1973. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 40, item
40 (1973). Article 124(4) of the Soviet Constitution authorizes a number of state
organs to request a finding of the CCS "concerning the conformity of international
treaty and other obligations of the USSR and the union republics with the Constitution of the the USSR and laws of the USSR." The article does not authorize the CCS
to enforce international human rights, but makes "the Constitution of the USSR and
laws of the USSR" the legal standard for determining whether "an act or its specific
provisions ... violate the rights and liberties of citizens." The Law on Constitutional
Supervision, however, "expands" the authority of the CCS, cf. art. 18 ("whether the
act ... does or does not conform to the USSR Constitution or to USSR laws, or,
when appropriate, to the USSR's international commitments as well"); art. 21 ("that
a particular normative legal act ...violates basic human rights and liberties codified
in the USSR Constitution and in international acts to which the USSR is a party
42. Izvs'irA,June 17, 1990, at 2.
43. See also Sergei S. Alekseev, What Is the Constitution?,Moscow NEws, May 6-13,
1990, at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mosnws File.
44. "The basic direction of the development of the political system of Soviet society is the further unfolding of socialist democracy: ...the extension of openness, and
permanent consideration of public opinion." KONST. SSSR art. 9 (1977).
45. "The Soviet state and all its organs function on the basis of socialist legality
and ensure the protection of the legal order, the interests of society, and the rights
and freedoms of citizens. State and social organizations and officials are bound to
observe the Constitution of the USSR and Soviet laws." Id. art. 4.
46. "Citizens of the USSR have the right to address complaints against actions of
officials and of state and social organs. Complaints must be considered in the manner and within the time limits established by law.
"Complaints may be brought to a court, in the manner established by law, against
actions which violate the law or exceed the authority of officials and which infringe
the rights of citizens." Id. art. 58.
47. "No one may be convicted of the commission of a crime, as well as be subjected to criminal punishment other than by a judgment of the court and in accordance with the law." Id. art. 160.
48. See Vedomosti SSSR, No. 12, item 189 (1990). See also KoNsT. SSSR art. 160
(1990).
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new forms of ownership, 50 and separation of powers. 5 ' By concentrat-

ing on civil rights under a doctrine of supremacy of international law
over national legislation, the Committee valiantly attempted to enhance
its legal as well as its political legitimacy.
B.

The Committee's Findings Prior to the August 19, 1991, Coup

On May 16, 1990, the Committee announced in the Soviet Legal Gazette
that it would examine, on its own initiative, the constitutionality of union

legislation concerning residential permits, 5 2 the exclusion of state
employees from court protection in labor disputes, 53 restrictions on
sellers' warranties in sales of defective goods,5 4 and President

Gorbachev's April 20, 1990, decree regulating mass meetings and demonstrations in Moscow. 55
On June 22, 1990, the CCS decided to examine whether several
provisions of federal criminal law and criminal procedure legislation
conformed with the constitutional presumption of innocence. 56 The
Committee at that time also accepted the proposal of Chairman of the
Supreme Soviet Anatolii Lukianov to examine normative acts of republics that had suspended or abrogated federal legislation safeguarding
housing rights of military personnel and of other categories of Soviet
57
citizens on republic territories.

49. Art. 6 of the 1977 Constitution had formulated the political monopoly of the
Communist Party ("The leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus
of its political system, of all state organizations and public organizations, is the Communist Party... The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines
the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home
and foreign policy of the USSR.. ."). It was modified to read: "The Communist
Party of the Soviet Union and other political parties, as well as trade union, youth and
other social organizations and mass movements, participate in the formulation of the
policy of the Soviet state and in the administration of state and social affairs through
their representatives elected to the Soviets of People's Deputies, and in other ways."
KONST. SSSR art. 6 (1990). See also the changes effected in art. 7. Id. art. 7 (1990).

50. See the changes effected in KONST. SSSR arts. 10-13 (1990).
51. Id. arts. 127 and 127.1 - 127.10 (1990) (establishing the post of President of
the USSR) reprinted in 16 REv. Soc. L. No. 2, at 208-10 (1990). See John Quigley, The
Soviet Presidency, 39 AM. J. CoMp. L. 67 (1991); R. Harcke, Zur Einfiihrung des Prd".
sidentenamtes in der UdSSR, 34 REChiT IN OsT UND WEsr No. 8, 334 (1990).
52. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 23, item 418 (1990).
53. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 23, item 419 (1990); finding (June 21) published in
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 27, item 524 (1990).

54. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 23, item 420 (1990); finding (Sept. 14), published in
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 776 (1990).

55. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 23, item 421 (1990); finding (Sept. 13), published in
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 774 (1990).

56. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 27, item 526 (1990); finding (Sept. 13), published in
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 775 (1990).
57. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 27, item 525 (1990); finding (Oct. 26), published in
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1003 (1990).
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Findings Adopted by the Committee on its Own Initiative

The Committee's first decisions provide the best key to understanding
its legal and political agenda. The Committee chose, on its own initiative, to examine violations of constitutionality and rule of law by the
legislative and executive branches of Soviet government. The content
and style of argument in these initial findings establish a pattern that is
repeated in the Committee's subsequent work. For the purpose of a
general assessment of the Committee's accomplishments it is thus
58
unnecessary to analyze each and every later finding of the CCS.
The Committee published its first finding, taken on its own initiative, on June 21, 1990. 59 The finding granted court protection to Soviet
state employees in labor disputes. In the past, some twenty million
workers in transport, communications, and energy production, as well as
doctors and teachers, had been denied the right to sue their employer,
60
the Soviet state.
In a lengthy introduction, the CCS stated that it had examined the
question in light of article 58 of the Constitution,6 1 several statutes of
the USSR, and international human rights acts. 62 It then published a list
of nullified Soviet normative acts and individual provisions of such acts.
It did not elaborate how international covenants fit into the formula it
used for nullification of these provisions and simply said the covenants
did "not correspond to the Constitution and laws of the USSR." '63
In its finding the Committee also noted its assumption that new
procedures for the settlement of labor disputes would be "established
by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR according to article twenty-two of
the USSR Law 'On Constitutional Supervision in the USSR' within a
three months' period." 6 4 In making this statement, the CCS seemed to
overstep its legal authority.6 5 Article twenty-two appears to apply only
to cases of suspension, not to cases of immediate nullification (as in the
present finding of violation of human rights). The Committee should
have exercised its right of legislative initiative under article twenty-three,
which does not envisage a time limit within which the legislature has to
58. For critical evaluations of the first findings of the CCS, see also Hartwig, supra
note 2, at 11-14; Schroeder, supra note 2, at 291-297; Wieser, supra note 2, at 190-93.
59. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 27, item 524 (1990).
60. See Yurii Feofanov, Pravo na isk, IzvEsTiA, June 25, 1990, at 1.
61. See supra note 46.
62. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 40, art. 7. ("All are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection
of the law .. "); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40,
art. 2, item 3(b):
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes... (b) To ensure that
any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities ofjudicial remedy ....
63. Finding (June 21), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 27, item 524 (1990).
64. Id. at 763.

65. Hartwig, supra note 2, at 12.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol, 25

respond. The Supreme Soviet did subsequently adopt the appropriate
changes in the law.
In the same session on June 21, the Committee reached a preliminary conclusion on President Gorbachev's decree concerning mass
events in Moscow 66 and circulated its draft to all parties concerned,
inviting their comments within fifteen days. 6 7 Under an ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR ofJuly 28, 1988,68 confirmed
on October 28, 1988, by the Supreme Soviet as the Law of the USSR On
the Procedure for Organizing and Holding Meetings, Rallies, Street
Processions and Demonstrations, 69 local authorities have the right to
prohibit mass events that contravene the Constitution or threaten public
order and the safety of citizens. The City of Moscow's unwillingness to
curb antigovernment demonstrations had angered Gorbachev. He
claimed that Moscow had special status as the seat of Soviet government
and determined by presidential decree of April 20, 1990, that the Council of Ministers, not the City Soviet, should exercise jurisdiction over
rallies and demonstrations in the Soviet capital.
On September 13, 1990, the Committee of Constitutional Supervision declared the President's ukaz unconstitutional and suspended its
application. 70 Under article 127.7 of the Constitution, the President
may pass decrees on the basis of the Constitution and Soviet laws, but
he is not empowered to change existing legislation. Thus, Gorbachev
had exceeded his constitutional authority. The Committee noted with
obvious relief that eight days earlier, on September 10, the President
had submitted proposals for legislative resolution of the question to the
Supreme Soviet. At least one author 71 has suggested that the Committee could have chosen the more forceful approach of considering the
President's decree a violation of the right of assembly under article 50 of
the Constitution, 7 2 thereby immediately nullifying the unconstitutional
ukaz. Nevertheless, the CCS was fully justified in addressing the issue as
one of regulatory authority rather than as a civil rights violation.
On the same day, the CCS found that norms permitting the regis66. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 17, item 301 (1990).
67. IzvEs-u,June 22, 1990, at 2. Art. 17 of the Law on Constitutional Supervision provides that "a draft of the Committee's conclusions and relevant materials are
sent to the meeting's participants no later than 15 days before the meeting." Law on
ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 17.
68. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 31, item 504 (1988); Decree of the Presidium on the USSR
Supreme Soviet on the Procedurefor OrganizingandHolding Meetings, Rallies, Street Processions
and Demonstrations in the USSR, IzvEsnA, July 29, 1988, at 2, translated in CURRENT
DIG. Soy. PRESs, Aug. 24, 1988, at 15.

69. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 44, item 689 (1988).
70. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 774 (1990).
71. Hartwig, supra note 2, at 12.
72. "In accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen
and develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of meetings and of street marches, and demonstrations ....
" KONST. SSSR art. 50.
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73
tration of a person as a criminal without a preceding court judgment
74
violated the constitutional presumption of innocence. The CCS found
unconstitutional and violative of international human rights acts a law
that "decriminalized" petty crime by transferring certain violations from
the jurisdiction of regular courts to administrative agencies or comrades' courts, yet permitted registration of convicted defendants as
criminals. The Committee voided the registration rule but did not nullify as human rights violations a number of other unconstitutional legislative acts. The Committee merely postulated their removal in the
course of the impending criminal law and criminal procedure reform.
On the second and final day of its September 1990 session, the CCS
surprisingly declared legislative provisions that permitted restrictions of
sellers' warranties for defective goods unconstitutional. 7 5 The Committee chose article 39, a dubious constitutional foundation, on which to
establish its role as an advocate of consumer protection, 76 and provided
neither legal reasoning nor legal remedy such as nullification or
suspension.
Later the CCS, on its own initiative in its monthly sessions, found
unconstitutional legal norms concerning residence permits; 7 7 norms
78
permitting forced medical treatment of alcoholics and drug addicts;
acts withdrawing Soviet citizenship from emigrants to Israel; 79 unpub-

73. Finding (Sept. 13), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 775 (1990).
74. KONST. SSSR art. 160.

75. Finding (Sept. 14), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39, item 776 (1990).
76. "Citizens of the USSR enjoy the full range of the socio-economic, political,
and personal rights and freedoms proclaimed and guaranteed by the Constitution of
the USSR and Soviet laws. The socialist system ensures the widening of rights and
freedoms and the continuous improvement of the living conditions of citizens in
accordance with the fulfillment of the programs of socio-economic and cultural
development ...... KONST. SSSR art. 39.
77. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1004 (1990). The CCS had already noted in a
tentative decision (reshenie) of Sept. 12, 1990, published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 39,
item 773 (1990), that the Council of Ministers of the USSR had reacted to the Committee's suggestions and had repealed 30 illegal acts, and that the Committee's
future finding should be based on a broad public discussion of the issue. The Law on
Constitutional Supervision does not provide for interlocutory decrees of this type.
Even in its subsequent finding of October 26, 1990, the CCS failed to reach the obvious conclusion of unconstitutionality and nullification of a broad range of legal

norms. It voided a few specific legal provisions and with respect to the great majority
of evidently unconstitutional regulations merely demanded that they be eliminated
from legislation "step by step," thus again exceeding its legal authority. Regarding
its follow-up finding of Oct. 11, 1991, see infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
78. KONST. SSSR arts. 41, 158. Accepted for examination, Vedomosti SSSR, No.
40, item 798 (1990); finding (Oct. 25), published in in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item

1001 (1990).
79. Accepted for examination Sept. 14, 1990, Vedomosti SSSR, No. 40, item 799

(1990); finding (Feb. 14), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 9, item 205 (1991). In
response to the Committee finding of Nov. 29, 1990, on unpublished normative acts,
the Soviet Legal Gazette published on page 270 of its issue Vedomosti SSSR, No. 8,
(Feb. 20, 1991) without item number the ukaz of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
of February 17, 1967, automatically depriving emigrants to Israel of their Soviet citizenship upon their leaving the USSR.
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lished norms affecting rights, freedoms and obligations of Soviet citizens;8 0 restrictions imposed on an effective defense in criminal trials; 8 '
and restrictions imposed on labor and employment rights of various cat82
egories of workers.
OnJune 27, 1991, the CCS, on its own initiative, adopted a finding
on the highly important question of delegation of sweeping legislative
powers from the Soviet legislature to the President. 83 The Committee
upheld as constitutional the Supreme Soviet Resolution of September
24, 1990, On Additional Measures for the Stabilization of the Country's
Economic and Public-Political Life, 8 4 which had granted the Soviet President the right to pass legislative decrees up to March 1992. Even
though constitutional law scholars had criticized this abdication of
responsibility by the Soviet legislature, the Committee saw no violation
of the separation of powers concept of the Constitution. It pointed out
that the President's legislative authority did not extend to criminal law
and criminal procedure or to the introduction of new taxes or other
In its finding of February 14, 1991, the Committee, in a one-page opinion, refers to
the preamble of the Law on the Citizenship of the USSR which, in accordance with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaims that "[i]n the USSR every citizen has a right to citizenship. Nobody may be arbitrarily deprived of citizenship or
the right to change his citizenship." According to art. 23 of the Law, withdrawal of
citizenship is permissible only "with respect to a person living abroad who has committed acts inflicting considerable damage to state interests or to the state security of
the USSR." The Committee states that the Supreme Soviet Presidium ukaz of 1967
violates this law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and article 34 of the
USSR Constitution regarding the equality of citizens. The Committee does not
expressly nullify the ukaz, however, and merely notes that the regular session of the
Supreme Soviet will repeal it in connection with the second reading of the Draft Law
on Exit from and Entry into the USSR. The Committee also refers to its right of
legislative initiative (article 23 of the Law on Constitutional Supervision) in suggesting that the Supreme Soviet grant citizens access to court protection in all matters of citizenship, including its loss. On the technical side, it may be noted that the
Committee does not provide a specific citation to the Universal Declaration (article
15), or to its binding nature, or to the Soviet Law on Citizenship of May 23, 1990,
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 23, item 435 (1990).
80. Accepted for examination on Sept. 14, 1990, Vedomosti SSSR, No. 40, item
800 (1990); finding (Nov. 29) published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 50, item 1080 (1990);
see also the report by A. Davydov, Secret Acts Invalidated,IZVESTIIA, Nov. 30, 1990, at 1,
translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Jan. 2, 1991, at 31. The Committee declared
all unpublished acts affecting citizens' rights, freedoms and obligations invalid under
article 22 of the Law on Constitutional Supervision unless published within a three-

month period. According to information supplied to the CCS, 70% of the 210 legal
acts concerning rights and freedoms of citizens were classified. Id.
81. Finding (Apr. 3), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 17, item 500 (1991).
82. Finding (Apr. 4), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 17, item 501 (1991).
83. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 856 (1991). The Committee had already
stated on February 15 that it was studying this question. At the same time the CCS
announced that it was looking into the legality of the Soviet government's measures
terminating the validity of 50- and 100-ruble notes in January 1991. See IzvEsTIIA,
Feb. 14, 1991, at 3.
84. Published as Law of the USSR, Vedomosti SSSR, No. 40, item 802 (1990),
also published in IZVESTnA, Sept. 26, 1990, at 1, translated in CURRENT DIG. SOy.
PRESS, Oct. 24, 1990, at 8.
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levies. Without substantive argument, the CCS in its June 27 finding
simply stated that
[t]he Constitution of the USSR does not contain provisions that permit or
forbid one government organ to delegate part of its compentencies to
another, but established practice of legislative organs of the USSR and
the republics assumes that such delegation is permissible. The institution
of delegated
legislation is also recognized in the practice of foreign
85
countries.
2. Findings Issued at the Request of Other State Organs
In a relatively small number of cases Union organs, such as the President of the USSR, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme
Soviet itself or one of its committees, asked the COS to invalidate republic enactments that violated human rights. For the most part, republic
violations of the Union Constitution, including violations of constitutionally or internationally guaranteed human rights, were declared
unconstitutional by presidential decree under article 127.3 of the Soviet
86
Constitution.
In only one case did a republic organ-the Supreme Soviet of the
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR)-request that the
CCS examine the constitutionality of a union act, President Gorbachev's
decree instituting joint military and police patrols. 8 7 The republics
apparently expected to receive little support and understanding of their
legal position vis-a-vis the central government from the CCS, and thus
generally refrained from asking its (predictable) opinion in jurisdictional
disputes.
A brief examination of the Committee's responses to requests for
findings will demonstrate that most cases concerned civil rights violations on the part of republics. The CCS did not hesitate to declare these
unconstitutional. The responses provide few further insights other than
confirming the limitations placed on the Committee's functions by the
government's expectations and the Committee's own choosing.
Although the Committee did not expressly reject requests from other
state organs to examine questions of constitutionality, evidence shows
delay and inactivity. To escape public criticism for procrastination the
CCS stopped announcing in the Soviet Legal Gazette issues it had chosen
or accepted for examination.
President Gorbachev's first request of the Committee8 8 was to
examine the Resolution of the Russian Congress of People's Deputies of
85. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 29, item 856 (1991).
86. KONST. SSSR art. 127.3, reprinted in 16 REv. Soc. L., No. 2, at 209. "The
President of the USSR: (I) acts as a guarantor of the observance of the rights and
liberties of Soviet citizens and the USSR Constitution and laws ...
87. See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
88. Accepted for examination on Sept. 14, 1990, Vedomosti SSSR, No. 40, item

797 (1990).
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June 20, 1990.89 The resolution forbade state officials to hold other
offices, including those in political or sociopolitical organizations. Boris
Yel'tsin, then Chairman of the Russian parliament, had left the Communist Party and used the resolution to challenge Gorbachev to relinquish
his position as Secretary General of the Communist Party on the
grounds that it was incompatible with his position as President. In its
finding of October 25, 1990, the CCS sided with President Gorbachev. 90
After closed deliberations lasting two hours, 9 1 the majority approved a
finding that the Russian resolution "does not conform to the Constitution of the USSR, to the labor legislation of the USSR and international
obligations of the USSR concerning human rights. It therefore loses
force at the moment of adoption of this finding."' 92 The Committee
based its finding on articles 6, 48 and 51 of the Soviet Constitution 93 as
well as on international human rights pacts. 94 Members Boskholov and
Bykov issued a very brief dissenting opinion.95
89. Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 4, item 52 (1990).
90. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1002 (1990).
91. IZVESTA, Oct. 27, 1990, at 1.
92. See supra note 90.
93. Article 6 of the Constitution, as amended March 14, 1990, reads:
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other political parties, as well
as trade union, youth and other social organizations and mass movements,
participate in the formulation of the policy of the Soviet state and in the
administration of state and social affairs through their representatives elected
to the Soviets of People's Deputies, and in other ways.
KONST. SSSR art. 6, reprinted in 16 Rzv. Soc. L., No. 2, at 170 (1990).
Article 48 states:
Citizens of the USSR have the right to participate in the administration of
state and public affairs, and in the discussion and adoption of laws and decisions of general state and local significance.
This right is ensured by the possiblility to participate in elections for, and
to be elected to Soviets of People's Deputies and other elective state organs,
and to take part in nationwide discussions and votes, in people's control, in
the work of state organs, social organizations, and organs of social initiative,
and in meetings of labor and residential collectives.
KONST. SSSR art. 48.
Article 51, as amended March 14, 1990, reads:
Citizens of the USSR have the right to form political parties and social
organizations and to participate in mass movements which promote the
development of political activeness and independent activity and the satisfaction of their manifold interests.
Social organizations are guaranteed the conditions for the successful fulfillment of their statutory tasks.
KONST. SSSR art. 51.
94. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 40, arts.
22, 25; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
40, art. 8; Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organize Adopted by the General Conference of the International
Labor Organization, July 9, 1948, arts. 2, 3, 8, 68 U.N.T.S. 17.
95. In their view, the Russian Resolution was not concerned with limiting rights
but with establishing legal conditions to be observed by persons aspiring to positions
of leadership in organs of state power or administration. By agreeing to occupy such
office, these persons voluntarily assume the duty of observing certain indispensable
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On December 21, 1990 the Committee acceded to a second request
by President Gorbachev and invalidated legislation of the Latvian republic as unconstitutional. 96 The legislation had imposed restrictions on
the housing rights of members of the Soviet Armed Forces.
On October 26, 1990, at the request of Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet Lukianov, the Committee invalidated legal acts of the three Baltic
republics and Moldavia (now Moldova), 9 7 which had suspended or abrogated Union legislation safeguarding special housing rights of Soviet
military personnel and their dependents in the republics. Committee
member Intskirveli appended a brief dissent to this opinion.9 8
On February 15, 1991, the Committee, responding to another
request by Lukianov, declared amendments to the Lithuanian Criminal
Code of October 4, 1990, unconstitutional. The amendments had introduced the death penalty for Lithuanian citizens participating in the activity of another state or foreign organization aimed at a violation of the
sovereignty of the Lithuanian republic.99
On May 24, 1991, at the request of the Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet, the Committee examined the Lithuanian Law on the Citizenship
of the Lithuanian SSR of November 3, 1989. It found that provisions of
the law, such as forcing Lithuanian citizens who retained their Soviet
citizenship to relinquish their Lithuanian citizenship, and treating nonLithuanian Soviet citizens as foreigners, violated rights and freedoms of
Soviet citizens under the Soviet Constitution, the Soviet Citizenship
Law, and article fifteen of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 10 0
Committee member Intskirveli wrote a dissenting
1° 1
opinion.
Acting on proposals of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February
21,102 March 11,103 and March 25, 1991,10 which concerned republic
legislation (acts of the Lithuanian, Moldavian, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian, Estonian and Kazakh republics) and impeded the conduct of the
legal requirements connected with the exercise of these functions. As a sovereign
state, Russia had the right to establish such conditions.
96. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 4, item 89 (1991); see also IzvsTA, Dec. 26, 1990, at 1.
97. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1003 (1990).
98. Intskirveli saw no foundation for declaring normative acts of these republics
unconstitutional. In his opinion, they did not abridge but rather confirmed that the
housing rights of servicemen and their families were equal to those of other citizens
of the respective republics. In contrast, ordinances of the Union government
granted unwarranted privileges to servicemen who had been transferred to the
reserve or retired and who demanded from the Defense Ministry, the KGB or the
MVD that lodgings be allocated in locations of their choice.
99. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 9, item 206 (1991).
100. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 26, item 741 (1991).
101. He took a political rather than a legal approach. In view of Lithuania's declaration of independence and the unresolved question of its further membership in the
USSR, it was inadvisable to find Lithuanian laws unconstitutional.
102. See Supreme Soviet Resolution in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 10, item 249 (1991).
103. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 12, item 326 (1991).

104. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 13, item 350 (1991).
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referendum on a future USSR on March 17, 1991,105 the Committee, on
April 3, passed a resolution (postanovlenie)t 0 6 confirming its March 5 declaration (zaiavlenie)10 7 that all republic legislation abridging free participation of citizens in the union referendum of March 17 violated the
Constitution. Since the respective republic legislation had become moot
by March 17, it could no longer be designated unconstitutional in a finding. The Committee insisted, however, that the union law on holding
national referendums be amended to address a number of vital points.
Specifically, The CCS demanded that future legislative drafts be submitted to the Committee so that it could issue a timely response.
At the request of the Russian Supreme Soviet, the Committee
examined President Gorbachev's decree ofJanuary 29, 1991,108 institutingjoint military and police patrols to maintain public order. In its finding of April 3, 1991, the Committee declared itself basically satisfied that
its earlier recommendations 10 9 to eliminate inconsistencies and shortcomings had been taken into account in draft legislation pending before
the Supreme Soviet. 1 10
On July 27, 1991, the CCS published a decision (reshenie)" I
accepting the proposals of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the
USSR and of the Supreme Soviet's Committee on Glasnost', Rights and
Petitions of Citizens to examine RSFSR President Yel'tsin's decree of
July 20, On Terminating the Activities of the Organizational Structures
of Political Parties and Mass Public Movements in State Agencies, Institutions and Organizations of the RSFSR. 112 Yel'tsin's departyization
decree caused a major political uproar.' 13 On July 26, the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party condemned it as
105. Of the 147 million voters that participated, 112 million (76%) voted in favor
of maintaining a USSR. See Resolution of the Supreme Soviet on the Results of the Referendum, Vedomosti SSSR, No. 13, item 350 (1991).
106. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 17, item 499 (1991).
107. IZVESTIIA, March 6, 1991, at 2.
108. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 6, item 173 (1991).
109. The Committee expressly exercised its right of legislative initiative in its state-

ment (zaiavlenie) of Feb. 13, 1991. Statement by the USSR ConstitutionalReview Committee
on Legislation on Questions of the Use of Military Personnel and on Ensuring Public Order,
IzvEsTim, Feb. 15, 1991, at 2, translatedin CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS, Mar. 20, 1991, at

6.
110. Finding (Apr. 3), published in Vedomosti SSSR, No. 17, item 498 (1991). See
Stephen Foye, Oversight Committee Rejects CPSU Control Over Armed Forces, RFE/RL
REPORT ON THE USSR, Apr. 19, 1991, at 4.

111. Decision of the USSR ConstitutionalReview Committee, IZVESTIIA, July 29, 1991, at
2, translated in CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS, Aug. 28, 1991, at 7.

112. On Terminating the Activity of the OrganizationalStructures of Political Parties and
Mass Public Movements in State Agencies, Institutions and Organizations of the RSFSR,
Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 31, item 1035, also available in Soy. RosSIA, July 23, 1991, at
1, translated in CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS, Aug. 21, 1991, at 1.
113. See CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Aug. 21, 1991, at 2-6; CURRENT DIG. Sov.

PRESS, Aug. 28, 1991, at 6-8. See also Elizabeth Teague & Julia Wishnevsky, ElI'tsin
Bans Organized PoliticalActivity in State Sector, 3 RFE/RL REPORT ON THE USSR, Aug.
16, 1991, at 21.
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an unlawful restriction of civil rights.11 4 President Gorbachev, still
heading the Soviet Communist Party as its Secretary General,
threatened to nullify Yel'tsin's decree with one of his own. 1 15 The Russian Council of Ministers, on the other hand, said the decree ensured
"equal rights for various public associations in the administration of
state affairs" by repealing privileges of the Communist Party. 16
In its decision to examine the decree for violations of constitutional
human rights, the CCS suggested to the Russian President that he suspend the implementation of the decree (it was to become effective on
August 4) during the Committee's examination. President Yel'tsin
expressly refused, 1 7 and, not surprisingly, remained unmoved by a similar plea made by V. Kuptsov, First Secretary of the Russian Communist
Party, on August 13.118 President Gorbachev, in discussing the issue
with Yel'tsin, did not push too hard for the decree's suspension or
repeal, apparently not wanting to risk the deterioration of a precarious
alliance forged with a view to adopting the Draft Union Treaty on
August 20.119
In a press conference following the meeting of the CCS, Chairman
Alekseev admitted that the Committee had already received requests to
review similar legislation on the part of Moldova and the Baltic republics
as much as six and eight weeks earlier. He pointed to the complexity of
the legal problem and promised an early decision that he hoped would
have a calming effect. 120 In fact, the CCS was in no hurry to reach a
conclusion. According to Soviet press reports, 12 1 Committee hearings
on the issue were scheduled for September 10 and 11, after the summer
vacations, and a decision could not be expected before the end of
September.
In the aftermath of the coup of August 19, 1991, which the CPSU
had helped prepare and execute, the Communist Party was sus114. Statement by the CPSUCentral Committee, PRAVDA, July 27, 1991, at 1, translatedin
CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS,

Sept. 4, 1991, at 7.

115. Brian Killen, Gorbachev Tells Soviet Communists to Adopt Democratic Reforms,
REUTERS,

July 27, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Libary, Currnt File.

116. Official Explanation, IZVESTIIA, July 29, at 2, translated in

CURRENT DIG. SOy.
Aug. 28, 1991, at 8. See also Yurii Feofanov, Na rabote nado rabotat'[OntheJob,
One Must Work] IzvESTnA, July 25, 1991, at 2, translated in CURRENT DIG. SOy. PRESS,
PRESS,

Aug. 28, 1991, at 7.
117. RSFSR President Reects Proposal, IzvESTIrA, July 31, at 1, translatedin

CURRENT

DIG. Soy. PRESS, Aug. 28, 1991, at 8.

118. See B. Yel'tsin Meets with Leader of Russia's Communists, IZVESTIIA, Aug. 14, 1991,
at 1, translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Sept. 18, 1991, at 33.
119. See interview with B. Yel'tsin. G. Alimov, B. Yel'tsin: We Are Sure that M.
Gorbachev Is Now Irrevocably Set on Reform, IZVESTIA, July 31, 1991, at 2, translatedin
CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Sept. 4, 1991, at 27-28.

120. ConstitutionalSupervision Committee on Yel'tsin DepartyizationDecree, BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, July 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Libraray, BBCSWP
File.
121. ConstitutionalFoot-Dragging,Soy. PRESS DIG., Aug. 8, 1991, at 1.
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pended.' 2 2 Thus the question of constitutionality of President Yel'tsin's
decree on departyization of the workplace became moot. 123 But
another Yel'tsin decree, On the Activity of the CPSU and the RSFSR
Communist Party, which outlawed the Communist Party in Russia on
November 6, 1991,124 provided another hotly contested legal issue.
Prominent legal scholars criticized the decree as clearly unconstitutional.' 25 Since the Russian Constitutional Court had become operative
on October 30, 1991, with the swearing in of its first thirteen judges, the
26
leaders of the Russian Communist Party asked it to review the decree.1
C.

The CCS After the Coup of August 19, 1991

While most Committee members had left Moscow for their summer
vacations, the August 19 coup and its aftermath produced a fundamentally different political and legal situation. Chairman Alekseev and four
Committee members-S. Boskholov, S. Mirzoev, M. Piskotin and V.
Filimonov-rmet immediately after announcement of the state of emergency, demonstrated civic courage and managed to have a statement,
albeit censured, printed in Pravda12 7 and Izvestiia. 12 8 The statement
somewhat obliquely questioned the legality of the self-styled State Committee for the State of Emergency's assumption of power and imposition
of a state of emergency in various parts of the country. On August 21,
after the coup had failed, the full CCS quickly decided to examine the
122. See On the Property of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Gorbachev's decree),
Vedomosti SSSR, No. 35, item 1024; Decree of the RSFSR President: On Suspending the
Activity of the RSFSR Communist Party, Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 35, item 1149 (1991),
also published in RossIIsL, A GAZETA, Aug. 27, at 3, translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy.
PRESS, Oct. 2, 1991, at 11.
123. See also President Gorbachev's decree of Aug. 24, 1991,publishedin Vedomosti
SSSR, No. 35, item 1026 (1991), On Terminatingthe Activity of PoliticalPartiesand Political Movements in the USSR Armed Forces, Law-Enforcement Agencies and the State Apparatus,
RossIISKxAA GAZETA, Aug. 27, 1992, at 3, translatedin CURRENT DIG. Sov. PRESS, Oct.
2, 1991, at 11.
124. Decree of the Presidentof the Russian Soviet FederatedSocialist Republic on the Activity
of the CPSU and the RSFSR Communist Party, Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 45, item 1537
(1991), also printed in RossIisKAiA GAZETA, Nov. 9, 1991, at 2, translated in CURRENT
DIG. Soy. PRESS, Dec. 11, 1991, at 4.
125. This Is What You Call Really Getting Back at Someone, PRAVDA Nov. 22, 1991, at 2,
translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Dec. 25, 1991, at 23.
126. Statements by Secretaries of Central Committee of Russian Communist Party, SovETSKAIA RossIA, Nov. 16, 1991, at 1, translatedin Soy. PRESS DIG., Nov. 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SPD File; see Carla Thorson, RSFSR Forms Constitutional
Court, 3 RFE/RL REPORT ON THE USSR No. 51/52, Dec. 20, 1991, at 13. See also the
statement of CPSU Deputy Secretary General V. Ivashko, made in Pravda, on the
question of the legality of B. Yel'tsin's decree supending the Communist Party. A.
Ilyin, The People PayforAny Coup, PRAVDA, Sept. 30, 1991, at 1, 3, translatedin CURRENT
DIG. Soy. PRESS, Oct. 30, 1991, at 15. Secretary V. Ivashko remarked, "[tihe highly
uncertain status, in the present situation, of the USSR Constitutional Review Committee makes appealing to it a hopeless undertaking ....
Id.
127. PRAVDA, Aug. 20, 1991, at 3, translatedin In the USSR ConstitutionalReview Committee, CURRENT Din. Soy. PRESS, Sept. 18, 1991, at 10.
128. IZVESTIIA, Aug. 20, 1991, at 2, translated in CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Sept.
18, 1991, at 10.
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decrees of the Emergency Committee. 12 9 The issue became moot on
the following day, when Gorbachev signed a presidential decree repealing all decisions issued by the Emergency Committee or any of its
members.13 0
On September 2, 1991, the CCS raised its voice in defense of constitutional procedures and insisted that the sweeping constitutional
changes envisaged in a Statement by the President of the USSR and the
Top Leaders of the Republics 13 1 required the approval of the Congress
of People's Deputies. 13 2 On September 5, the Congress adopted a corresponding USSR Law on USSR Bodies of State Power and Administration During the Transitional Period.' 33 Without being expressly
designated as such, the provisions of the law were intended as constitutional amendments; in fact article eight of the law states: "The provisions of the USSR Constitution are in effect insofar as they are not at
variance with this law."' 3 4 The law did not mention the CCS, but
affected its functions by abolishing the Congress of People's Deputies, 13 5 granting a new Supreme Soviet power to make constitutional
changes subject to ratification by the republic parliaments,13 6 and giving
every republic the right to suspend any laws passed by the USSR
Supreme Soviet that did not correspond to the republic's
1 37
constitution.
In a Soviet television interview on October 11, 1991,138 CCS Chairman Alekseev attempted to conduct "business as usual." He reported
that the Committee had discussed the important question of ownership
rights, and that a finding could be expected in four to six weeks. He also
critidirected attention to the CCS's public statement (zaiavlenie), which
m
39
cized violations of legality and constitutionality on all levels.
Chairman Alekseev stated that the Committee had again addressed
129. Russian State Security Employees Against Merger with InternalAffairs, BBC SUMMARY
Aug. 23, 1991 (TASS, Aug. 21, 1991), available in LEXIS,

OF WORLD BROADCASTS,

Nexis Library, BBCSWP File.
130. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 35, item 1009 (1991).
131. IZVESTmA, Sept. 2, 1991, at 1, translatedin CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Oct. 9,

1991, at 5.
132. Committee for

Supervision of the Constitution Adopts Statement, BBC SUMMARY OF
WORLD BROADCASTS, Sept 4, 1991 (TASS, Sept. 2, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis

Library, BBCSWP File.
133. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 37, item 1082 (1991); IzvEsTIA, Sept. 6, 1991, at 2,
translated in The USSR Law on USSR Bodies of State Power and Administration During the
TransitionalPeriod,CURRENT DIG. Sov. PRESS, OCt. 16, 1991, at 11 [hereinafter USSR
Law on USSR Bodies].
134. USSR Law on USSR Bodies, supra note 133, art. 80.
135. Id. art. 1.
136. Id. arts. 4 and 8.
137. Id. art. 2.

138. Interview by Sergei Alexeyev, Chairof the USSR ConstitutionalCommittee, with USSR
Television, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,

Currnt File.
139. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 46, item 1308 (1991).
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the question of residence permits. In its finding of October 11, 1991,140
the CCS followed up on its previous finding of October 26, 1990.141
The Committee deplored that no legislative action had been taken in the
meantime to abolish, or at least to modify, an unconstitutional denial of
civil rights perpetrated by existing procedures of granting or withholding residence permits by administrative authorities. In its initial finding,
the Committee had insisted on the need to bring legal regulations concerning the residence permit (propiska) system 14 2 into accord with the
Soviet Constitution and international human rights conventions, in particular article thirteen of the Universal Declaration and article twelve of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. At that time,
rather than striking down all norms denying Soviet citizens freedom of
movement and free choice of domicile, the CCS suggested their gradual
revision by the legislature. The Committee had declared only a small
number of specific limitations unconstitutional and immediately inapplicable. Apparently, the CCS had exercised restraint because, on the one
hand, the Soviet Constitution itself did not provide the rights in question, and on the other hand, the immediate nullification of the residence
permit system might have caused major housing and unemployment
problems.
In its finding of October 11, 1991, the CCS stated that
Provisions regarding residence permits as approved by the USSR Council
of Ministers, as well as other resolutions by the USSR government on
residence registration establishing an obligation for individuals to obtain
permission from administrative bodies to reside, be employed or enrolled
in educational establishments, sell residential houses, apartments, country houses, garages, as well as establish responsibility for the breach of
these obligations, are not consistent with the USSR Constitution, the Declaration14 on Human Rights and Freedoms [or) international acts on human
rights.'

The Committee declared immediately invalid those provisions that
"restrict the right of property owners to possess, manage and use at
their discretion their residential houses, apartments and other property," or provisions that concern "responsibility of individuals for the
breach of residence permit rules."' 44 All other unjustified residence
rules would not be void until January 1, 1992, in order to give the gov-

ernment sufficient time to pass new regulatory acts.
140. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 46, item 1307 (1991); Conclusion of the USSR Constitutional Committee Concerning the Residence Permit ProceduresApplied to Individuals, FEDERAL
NEws SERVICE Oct. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File [hereinafter Conclusion of the USSR ConstitutionalCommittee on Residence Permit Procedures]. This is

the last finding of the CCS published in Vedomosti SSSR.
141. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 47, item 1004 (1990).
142. Id.
143. Conclusion of the USSR ConstitutionalCommittee on Residence Permit Procedures,supra
note 140.
144. Id.
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In reaching these conclusions, the CCS emphasized that the legal
foundations of the residence permit regulations had "ceased to exist"
with the adoption of article 21 of the Declaration of Human Rights and
Freedoms. 145 This sort of legal reasoning is difficult to follow. It would
seem that these regulations had never had any constitutional or statutory basis. Moreover, the Declaration of Human Rights and Freedoms,
adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies on September 5, is of
doubtful rank in the hierarchy of Soviet legal norms. It was promulgated in the Soviet Legal Gazette14 6 but was not designated a statute
(zakon) or a constitutional amendment. During the parliamentary debate
concerning adoption of the Declaration, Deputy I.B. Shamshev specifically asked: "Article twenty-one reads 'Every person has the right to
move freely within the country and to choose a place of residence.' How
will this be implemented, for example, when we have restrictions on residence permits?"1 4 7 Deputy V. N. Kudriavtsev, Chairman of the Preparatory Group on the Draft Declaration, replied:
The declaration should be implemented in several forms. First, we think
that if a USSR Constitution is adopted, the Declaration should be a part
of it. Second, when the Union republics draft their own Constitutions
they should rely on the text of this declaration. Third, specific laws that
would make it possible to implement the provisions of the Declaration
should be devised and worked out. For example, in order to implement
the right to move freely within the country, it is necessary to change the
residence permit situation .... 148
Kudriavtsev and the Congress apparently did not consider the Declaration to be immediately applicable constitutional law.
It is not clear why the CCS on the one hand refrained from fully
utilizing the opportunities offered by the wording of article twenty-one
of the Law on Constitutional Supervision 14 9 in declaring international
human rights accords immediately applicable in its first finding on residential permits, and on the other hand relied so strongly on article
twenty-one of the (Soviet) Declaration as a foundation for its second
finding.
On the practical side, Committee Chairman Alekseev explained in
his press conference on October 11, 1991, that a hearing conducted by
the CCS had shown that representatives of all state agencies concerned
had agreed that the existing residence permit rules had outlived their
145. Id.

146. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 37, item 1083 (1991).
147. IZVESTIIA, Sept. 6, 1991, at 6.
148. Id. at 6, translatedin CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Oct. 9, 1991, at 10.
149. "A conclusion by the USSR Constitutional Review Committee stating that a
particular normative legal act or individual provisions thereof violates basic human
rights and liberties codified in the USSR Constitution and in international acts to
which the USSR is a party entails the voiding of this act or individual provisions
thereof from the moment that the Committee's conclusion is adopted." CURRENT
DIG. SOV. PRESS, Apr. 4, 1990, at 15.
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usefulness. 150 Izvestiia commentator Yurii Feofanov wondered how the
republics would react to this finding.' 5 ' Moscow Vice Mayor Yurii
Luzhkov was quick to point out that Russian laws had precedence over
Union legislation in Moscow, and, given that more than 800,000 people
were on the waiting list for housing, and in light of Moscow's notorious
food shortages, the city government would make no changes in the system of mandatory residence permits in Moscow prior to "serious pre1 52
paratory work."
D.

The Final Days of the CCS

The last regular two-day working session of the CCS seems to have
taken place immediately preceding Chairman Alekseev's press conference on November 29, 1991. In this session, the Committee found
unconstitutional the Armenian parliament's resolution abolishing the
autonomy of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. 153 The Committee also pointed to a need for revision of the law on the militia and
state security bodies concerning the tapping of telephone conversations,
entry into dwellings and opening of mail.' 54 The Committee furthermore proposed that the Union and republic parliaments protect civil
rights more effectively by cancelling or at least more clearly defining in
these legislative acts general clauses such as "non-fulfillment of laws,"
"open civil disobedience" and "not taking measures to remove the
causes and conditions of law violations."'15 5 Chairman Alekseev also
informed journalists that he had received an offer to head a scientific,
inter-republic, private law center.' 5 6 Stressing the importance of such
an institution to society, he was obviously preparing a dignified exit
from the sinking ship.
On December 11, 1991, the CCS issued a statement reacting to the
Minsk Declaration of December 8 by the presidents of Russia, Belarus
and Ukraine that the "USSR as an entity in international law and as a
geopolitical reality has ceased to exist." 1 57 According to the CCS this
150. Head of Committeefor ConstitutionalSupervision on Resident Permit Abolition, Rossi12, 1991, available in BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct.
16, 1991, LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWP File.
151. IZVESTIIA, Oct. 14, 1991, at 1, translatedin Yurii Feofanov, Farewell to Residence
Permits-USSR ConstitutionalReview Committee Declares Institution of Residence Permits IlleISKAIA GAZETA, Oct.

gal, CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Nov. 13, 1991, at 28.

152. IZVESTIIA, Oct. 15, 1991, at 1, translated in V. Belika, The Capital's Government
Isn't Abolishing Residence Permits, CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Nov. 13, 1991, at 29.
153.

Committeefor Supervision of the Constitution on Judicial Life of Country, BBC SUM-

MARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec. 2, 1991 (TASS, Nov. 29, 1991), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BBCSWP File. The decisions of this and the following sessions of the
CCS have not been published in Vedomosti SSSR.

154. Id.
155. Id.

156. Id.
157. IZVESTIIA, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1; A Post-Soviet Commonwealth, WASH. POST, Dec. 10,

1991, at A20.
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assertion was "without legal force."' 58 Although the republics were
free to conclude treaties among themselves, they could not thereby
determine the fate of third parties. The USSR could only be dissolved
in an appropriate constitutional procedure.
In one of its last sessions, on December 12, 1991, sensing the inevitable break-up of the Union, the Committee passed a resolution emphasizing that multilateral international treaties of the USSR remained in
force and binding even on the republics that had not expressly affirmed
their obligations under these treaties (especially nuclear non-proliferation and human rights treaties).1 59
The final word from the Committee came on December 23, 1991,
when it acknowledged that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and
dissolved itself. 60 Committee Chairman Alekseev expressed the belief
that the Commonwealth of Independent States would need a legal organ
"to protect human rights, promote democracy and stop arbitrariness of
any authorities as well as to solve interstate conflicts."' 6 '
E.

Evaluation of the Findings

The content and style of the Committee's findings frequently leave the
reader baffled. The findings are usually extremely brief; their references
to legal sources vague; their language abounds with sweeping generalities and often lacks legal precision. The Committee's opinions are
devoid of the rigorous interpretation and analysis that marks their Western counterparts; they convey no sense of opposing viewpoints to a constitutional dispute or of scholarly theory.
More than once they leave the reader with the impression that the
Committee timidly preferred to act as an advisor to and lobbyist for the
legislative and executive branches of government rather than as the
forceful representative of an equal "third power,"' 62 which would
openly argue and assert the tenets of constitutionality against the other
branches.
The Committee's cautious approach met with some success. Many
findings contain specific suggestions for future legislative activity that
were promptly taken up by the Soviet parliament. Even outside the
framework of its findings, the CCS occasionally made formal use of its
right of legislative initiative.1 63 Thus, on April 4, 1991, the Committee
158. ConstitutionalCommittee Denies that USSR Has Ceased to Exist, BBC SUMMARY OF
Dec. 13, 1991 (TASS, Dec. 11, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis

WORLD BROADCASTS,

Library, BBCSWP File.
159. ConstitutionalCommittee on Validity of InternationalArmsTreaties, BBC SUMMARY OF
16, 1991 (TASS, Dec. 12, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis

WORLD BROADCASTS, Dec.

Library, BBCSWP File.
160. Soviet ConstitutionalCompliance Committee to Disband,XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAS
NEws SERVICE, Dec. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File.

161. Id.

162.

Cf. Yurii Feofanov, Pravo na vlast', IZVESTIIA, June 25, 1991, at 1.
163. Law on ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 23.
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adopted a resolution (postanovlenie)1' 4 urging the Supreme Soviet to
accede to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
16 5
and Political Rights. The Supreme Soviet responded without delay.
On May 23, the CCS suggested that the Supreme Soviet consider leasing
16 6
as a major form of privatization of state enterprises.
Furthermore, according to public statements by Chairman Alekseev
and Deputy Chairman Lazarev, illegal administrative acts beyond the
purview of the Committee were protested by the Procuracy' 6 7 or
changed by order of the Council of Ministers 168 once the Committee
had declared their statutory or substatutory legal foundations
unconstitutional.
Chairman Alekseev and other members of the Committee repeatedly complained in the press about the unfortunate term and concept of
"constitutional supervision." They demanded instead the institution of
a genuine Constitutional Court, with the right of nullifying, instead of
only suspending, legislation, including the laws of the republics. 16 9
They were dissatisfied that they could not examine all constitutional violations on their own initiative, and they deplored their limited powers to
investigate prior to adopting a finding, and to monitor the implementa70
tion of findings.'
Chairman Alekseev tried to impress his legal views on legislators,
on Party meetings and on the public at large-by giving regular press
conferences after the monthly sessions of the Committee, frequently
speaking at sessions of the Soviet parliament, giving interviews on television, and publishing articles. Nevertheless, some of these activities may
have hurt rather than helped his campaign for judicial independence
and respect for law. Alekseev frequently engaged in political lobbying,
such as favoring a strong president of the USSR or a new system of
property relations. He was also openly involved in Communist Party
politics, as his speech at the Central Committee Meeting of the CPSU on
February 7, 1990 demonstrates. 17 1 Although these activities may have
been intended to promote the visibility and influence of the CCS, they
164. Vedomosti SSSR, No. 17, item 502 (1991).
165. On July 5, the Supreme Soviet adopted two Resolutions: Vedomosti SSSR,
No. 29, items 842, 843 (1991), acceding to the Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), Dec. 16, 1966, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, and recognizing the jurisdiction of the Committee for Human Rights under article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
166. I received a copy of the resolution from Dep. Chin. Lazarev; it was not printed
in Vedomosti SSSR.
167. See Ovcharenko, supra note 32, at 2 (Lazarev interview).
168. See Sergei Alekseev, Tret'ya vlast', IzvEsTHA, Feb. 23, 1991, at 3.

169. Cf id.; see also Sergei Alekseev, Konstitutsiia i vlast', IZVESTHA, Dec. 3, 1990, at 3;
Ovcharenko, supra note 32; Alekseev, supra note 2, at 200.

170. Alekseev, supra note 168; see also Mikhail Piskotin, Konstitusii nuzhna zashchita,
IzvEsT1iA, Jan. 26, 1991, at 3.

171. BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Feb. 12, 1990 (TASS, Feb. 7, 1990),
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWP File.
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were perceived by others as personal political ambition and dependence
on the part of the Committee chairman. This impression may have reinforced a latent skepticism and aloofness of the Soviet intellectual establishment, without whose active support and involvement no effective

legal system and no pervasive legal culture will take root.
The public perception of the CCS seems to have been based both
on exaggerated expectations that the Committee was unable to fulfill,
and on a profound distrust of its potential. Many of my impatient Russian friends lamented that the history of the Committee is one of missed

opportunities. According to some observers, not a single genuine
reformer was included in the Committee membership. Influential Com-

mittee members were said to owe personal loyalty to either Gorbachev
or Lukianov, who had a stronger interest in preserving an improved version of the old system than in radical renewal. In view of the impending
transformation of the political system under pressure from the republics, Committee members were maneuvering for appointments to the
future Constitutional Court projected under the Draft Union Treaty, a
court necessarily much smaller than the Committee of twenty-seven or
twenty-one. One may speculate from which point in time and to what
extent these legitimate worries influenced the deliberations and decisions of the Committee. Chairman Alekseev, at any rate, seems to have
kept his options open; according to recent press accounts, he now functions as Chairman of the Inter-Republic Research Center on Private
173
Law 1 72 and plans to establish a Legal Center on Private Enterprise.
In retrospect, the Committee members could have shown more
political courage and legal enterprise. They could have worked much
harder, could have passed more findings, should have developed more
constitutional theory, and certainly might have created much more publicity and public support. Such efforts would not have been lost on their
legal and political environment. But it should also be noted that the
Committee did not receive the sort of attention and support it was entitled to from either the press or the scholarly establishment. On the one
hand, the press, with very few exceptions, such as the highly intelligent,
politically perceptive and untiring efforts of Izvestiia commentator Yurii
Feofanov, 174 could and should have made much greater efforts in highlighting legal developments and urging more respect of the law. On the
other hand, Soviet legal scholars, somewhat to their discredit, failed to
analyze each and every finding of the Committee critically, and to enter
into a public dialogue to develop constitutional doctrine and educate
172. Louis Uchitele, The Art of a Russian Deak Ad-Libbing Contract Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1992, at Al.

173. Ku.ANw, Jan. 22, 1992, at 4; Nikolai Andreyev, We May DissappearAsa Nation,

Soy. PRESS DIG., Jan. 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, SPD File.
174. See, e.g., IZvESIMA, Nov. 11, 1990, at 3; (interview with Yurii Feofanov con-

cerning disrespect for Soviet laws); see also Yurii Feofanov, Sposobna 1i vlast' byt'
chestnoi, IzvESTIIA, Dec. 16, 1990, at 3; Feofanov, Pravo na vlast, supra note 162.
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politicians and the population about the values of separation of powers
and rule of law.
In fairness to the Committee and its critics, however, it should be
noted that the centrifugal forces in the political system, the surviving
strength of administrative bureaucracies and their lawless ways, the
traditional lack of judicial authority, and resultant enforcement deficits
posed powerful obstacles to the effective work of the CCS. Even if it had
multiplied its efforts and had received the full support of the entire legal
and intellectual community, it would probably not have been able to
overcome these formidable shadows of the past.
The Committee's successes and failures showed lawyers and politicians the need for a stronger third power in a functioning system of separation of powers with appropriate checks and balances. In many
instances the Committee succeeded in alerting legislative and executive
authorities to the need for more careful constitutional examination of
their enactments. One of its most important and constructive contributions to Soviet legal thought was no doubt its initiative in interpreting
the Soviet Constitution and all Soviet legislation in the light of international human rights accords. 175 By including them in the Soviet legal
system as immediately applicable law, the Committee raised the standard of Soviet law to an unprecedented level of Westerp legal culture.
The Committee thus served as an essentially positive transition
towards a strong Russian Constitutional Court, which is currently in the
process of establishing its authority. The draftsmen of the 1991 Law on
the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR have benefitted both from studying Western models and from observing the problems and limitations of
the brief experiment with Soviet constitutional review. Much as there
would not be Yel'tsin without Gorbachev, the CCS paved the way to a
modern and effective system of constitutional review, the capstone of
rule of law not only in Russia, but possibly also in other republics who
may continue to look to Russia for guidance in their legal reform.
Depending on the degree of political and legal integration that may
176
eventually be achieved in the Commonwealth of Independent States,
it may be necessary to establish a Commonwealth Court with jurisdic175. See supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text.
176. In Minsk on December 8, the Presidents of the three Slavic republics, Russia,
Belorussia (now Belarus) and Ukraine, stated that the Soviet Union had ceased to
exist. IzvEsTUA, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1. See also Serge Schmemann, DeclaringDeath of Soviet
Union, Russia and Two Republics Form New Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at
Al; Michael Dobbs, Slavic Republics Declare Soviet Union Liquidated,WASH. POST, Dec. 9,

1991, § 1, at Al. They signed an Agreement on a Commonwealth of Independent
States, which other states could join. On December 21 in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan,
eight more republics, i.e., all former union republics except the three Baltic republics
and Georgia, joined the Commonwealth as "founding members." See Ann Sheehy,
Commonwealth of Independent States: An Uneasy Compromise, I RFE/RL RESEARCH REPORT
No. 2,Jan. 10, 1992, at 1. See also Michael McGuire, Republics Sign Pact, Killing Soviet
Union: Eleven States Fora New Entity, with Georgia Going Own Way, Cim. TRIB., Dec. 22,
1991, at 1; Eleven Soviet States Form Commonwealth Without Clearly DefiningIts Powers, N.Y.
TiMES, Dec. 22, 1991, § 1, at 1.
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tion transcending the framework of republic constitutions. This would
not be a Constitutional Court as originally envisaged in the Draft Union
Treaty, 177 but rather a Human Rights Court, similar to the judicial
mechanism set up in Strasbourg under the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 178 or a Court
similar to the European Court of Justice established by the European
179
Community in Luxembourg.
HI.

The Russian Constitutional Court

A.

Establishment of the Court

The USSR Law on Constitutional Supervision in the USSR of December
23, 1989, authorized the union republics and autonomous republics to
177. The "final version" of the Draft Treaty on a Union of Sovereign States that
had been agreed upon by Gorbachev and republic leaders on July 23, 1991, IzVsTIIA, July 24, 1991, at 1, was scheduled for signature on Aug. 20 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Belorussia (now Belarus) and Tadzhikistan. It was expected that
others (Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenia, Kyrgystan and also Ukraine) would follow in the
fall. IzvEsnA, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1; IzvEs nA, Aug. 10, 1991, at 1.
Art.17 of this Draft Treaty provided for a Constitutional Court of the Union of
Sovereign Republics which
examines questions of conformity of legislative acts of the Union and the
republics, of decrees of the President of the Union and the presidents of the
republics, and of normative acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Union with
the Union Treaty and the Constitution of the Union, and also decides disputes between the Union and republics as well as among republics ....
IZVESTIIA, Aug. 15, 1991, at 1-2, translatedin CURRENT DIG. Sov. PRESS, Sept. 4, 1991,
at 21-24. Art. 18 provided for union (federal) courts: a Supreme Court of the Union
of Sovereign Republics, a Supreme Arbitration Court, and courts of the Armed
Forces of the Union.
The August 19 coup d'6tat, though abortive, encouraged centrifugal forces and
completely undermined any further attempts to renew the federal system from
above. Agreement on a revised draft was announced by President Gorbachev and
representatives of seven republics after a State Council meeting on Nov. 14. IzvEsTIA, Nov. 15, 1991, at 1, translatedin G. Alimov, Get Used to the Words: Union of Sovereign States (USS), CURRENT DIG. Soy. PRESS, Dec. 18, 1991, at 10. In a follow-up
meeting on Nov. 25, originally intended for formal approval, the representatives of
the republics not only completely reworked the draft but refused to sign it prior to its
submission to the republic parliaments. This stillborn draft no longer envisaged a
union constitution or a constitutional court. It did, however, retain a Union Supreme
Court (art. 17) that
makes decisions on questions of the compliance of union laws and laws of the
states party to the treaty with the present treaty and with the Declaration of
Human Rights and Freedoms; hears civil and criminal cases of an interstate
nature, including cases concerning the protection of citizens' rights and freedoms ....
Amendments to Draft Treaty on Union of Sovereign States, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Nov. 28, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWP File.
178. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 19-56, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The republics may, however,
follow the example of East European states like Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
and become parties to the European Convention.
179. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY arts. 164-188.

See also Alekseev, supra note 2, at 203.
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establish organs of constitutional supervision.18 0 Whereas some of the
republics followed the example of the Union and created Committees of
Constitutional Supervision, Russia established a genuine Constitutional
Court.
The Russian Supreme Soviet adopted a comprehensive and detailed
Law on the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR on May 6, 1991.181 The
Russian Congress of People's Deputies approved the law with minor

alterations on July 12, 1991.182 Guided by Western models, including
that of the United States, but primarily by German, Austrian and Italian
constitutional models, 183 the Russian Constitutional Court will not
merely render findings, but opinions that are final' 84 and have immediately nullifying effect. 18 5 The fifteen judges will enjoy tenure until age
sixty-five 18 6 and additional strong protection of judicial indepen-

dence. 18 7 They will entertain citizens' complaints against
unconstitu18 8

tional practices ofjudicial and administrative agencies.
The election of the judges of the Constitutional Court was postponed until the fall session of the Congress. On October 29, 1991, the
session of the Fifth RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies opened. Deputies briefly heard and questioned twenty-one candidates for membership in the Russian Constitutional Court.' 8 9 The Congress elected

thirteen judges by secret vote. 19 0 The following day, the first thirteen

judges of the Constitutional Court were sworn in and the Court became
operational. 19 The election of two more judges was postponed until
180. Law on ConstitutionalReview, supra note 6, art. 2.
181. Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 19, item 621 (1990) [hereinafter Russian Law on the
Constitutional Court].
182. Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 30, item 1016 (1991) (introductory resolution);
Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 30, item 1017 (1991) (statute); RossusKAxA GAZETA, Aug. 14,
1991, at 3-6, translated in Law on RSFSR Constitutional Court, FBIS-USR-91-029,
Sept.10, 1991, at 21-46.
183. Cf. the German GESETZ UBER DAS BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT [Law on the
Federal Constitutional Court] of March 12, 1951, BGBI. I S.243, as amended. The
Russian Law on the Constitutional Court consists of 89 articles grouped in four parts:
I. General Provisions (arts. 1-11); II. Status ofJudges of the Constitutional Court of
the RSFSR (arts. 12-26); III. Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR
(arts. 27-79); IV. Concluding Provisions (arts. 80-89).
184. Russian Law on the Constitutional Court, supra note 181, art. 50.
185. Id. arts. 49 and 65.
186. Id. art.15(2).
187. See id. arts. 6 and 14-26.
188. Id. arts. 66-73.
189. For brief biographical information see RossiISKAIA GAZETA, Aug. 14, 1991, at
6.
190. Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 44, item 1450 (1991); ConstitutionalCourt Elected, BBC
SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 31, 1991 (TASS, Oct. 29, 1991), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWP File; Thorson, supra note 126. The average age of
the judges is 50. One is a woman, Tamara G. Morshchakova, born 1936, doctor of
juridical science, senior researcher, All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Soviet
Administration and Legislation [V.N.I.I.], specialization in state law.
191. The Court can begin to function once at least ten members have been
elected. Russian Law on the Constitutional Court, supra note 181, art. 3(4).
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the next Congress. 19 2
As provided under article three of the Law, the judges 193 subsequently elected the Chairman 19 4 and the Deputy Chairman of the Constitutional Court by secret vote. 195 On November 22, 1991, the Russian
Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution authorizing a secretariat of the
Constitutional Court comprising 247 employees, and it ordered the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to take measures safeguarding the organization and work of the Court. 19 6
B.

The First Case Before the Court

On November 1, 1991, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies voted
President Yel'tsin special powers to reform Russia's economic and political system. The power delegated included the right to reorganize the
supreme bodies of executive power by presidential decree.' 9 7 President
192. Russian ConstitutionalCourtJudges Sworn In, XINHUA GENERAL OVERSEAs NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 30, 1991, avaialabLe in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File.
193. For their names and prior functions, see Thorson, supra note 126, at 15.
194. The Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Professor Valerii Dmitrievich
Zor'kin was born in 1943, graduated from law school at Moscow State University in
1964, and immediately began an academic career at the same school. In 1980 he was
appointed professor of law (Constitutional Law and Theory of State and Law) at the
Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) of the USSR. In 1986 he became
professor at the Correspondence Law School of the MVD. He holds a higher doctorate in law and served as leader of the expert group of the Constitutional Commission.
195. Deputy Chairman Nikolai Vasil'evich Vitruk was born in 1937, graduated
from law school in Tomsk in 1959 and subsequently pursued an academic career
(Theory of State and Law) at the Kiev State University Law School. He holds a higher
doctorate in law. Between 1971 and 1981 he worked as Senior Research Associate in
the Institute of State and Law of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow. From
1981 to 1984, he taught as professor of law (Constitutional Law and Theory of State
and Law) at the Academy of the MVD; since 1984 he has headed the Department of
State Law of the Correspondence Law School of the MVD.
196. Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 50, item 1743 (1991); Decision on ProtectingJudges,
Courts Adopted, FBIS-SOV-91-228, Nov. 26, 1991, at 54. In pursuance of this mandate, a Presidium resolution of Dec. 2, 1991, specified rights of the Court and individual judges (access to information, free transport, official cars, vacations, etc.).
Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 50, item 1757 (1991). On Nov. 14, the Supreme Soviet had
decreed equal pay for the highest functionaries of the three branches of government
(Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, President of the RSFSR, Chairman of the Constitutional Court), imposing a limit of twenty-one times the legal minimum wage.
Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 47, item 1591 (1991).
197. Resolution of Nov. 1, 1991, No. 1830-I, Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 44, item 1455
(1991), On the Organizationof Executive PowerDuring the Periodof RadicalEconomic Reform.
Section 2 states: "That the RSFSR President is to resolve on his own ... questions
concerning the reorganization of the structure of the supreme organs of executive
power until the adoption of the RSFSR Law On the RSFSR Council of Ministers."
Resolution of Nov. 1, 1991, No. 1831-1, Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 44, item 1456
(1991), On the Legal Protection of the Economic Reform. Section 3 states:
Draft RSFSR presidential decrees on questions of banking, stock market...
and the competence, procedure for the formation, and activity of executive
organs issued for the purpose of the flexible regulation of the course of the
economic reform which contravene existing laws of the RSFSR shall be submitted by the RSFSR president to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and in the
period between sessions to the Supreme Soviet Presidium. If a draft RSFSR
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Yel'tsin used this power when he signed on December 19, 1991, the
Decree on the Formation of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs
of the RSFSR,19 8 which merged two previously separate institutions and
created a police ministry of unprecedented proportions.
The decree immediately met with strong criticism from the other
two branches of government. The Russian Supreme Soviet, on December 26, adopted with only one opposing vote a resolution urging the
President to rescind his merger of the regular police ministry with the
former KGB.' 99 On the same day the Russian Constitutional Court
issued a warning to President Yel'tsin in connection with several of his
decrees concerning the media, the security service and economic
reform. The Court promised that it would "take actions to protect the
constitutional system in the country and to preclude the onslaught of
dictatorship and arbitrariness-wherever they come from." 20 0 On
December 28, V. Zor'kin, Chairman of the Constitutional Court, implementing his Court's ruling, requested that President Yel'tsin suspend
the Decree On the Formation of the RSFSR Ministry of Security and
Internal Affairs until the Session ofJanuary 11201 when the Court would
consider a complaint brought against the decree by a group of deputies
of the Russian Supreme Soviet. 20 2 President Yel'tsin did not respond.
On January 6, 1992, during a television inverview S. M. Shakhrai, Deputy Prime Minister and chief legal adviser to President Yel'tsin,
defended the amalgamation of the two ministries and explained that it
20 3
was a logical step to stop duplication of functions.
presidential decree is not rejected by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet within
seven days ... the decree shall come into force ....
RossslKAm GAZETA, Nov. 5, 1991, at 1, translatedin Law on RSFSR ConstititionalCourt,
FBIS-SOV-91-215, Nov. 6, 1991. See also IzvEsTuA, Nov. 2, 1991, at 1, translatedin I.
Yelistratov, Russia's President Is Given the "Green Light" to Conduct RadicalReforms, CURRENT DiG. Soy. PRESS, Dec. 4, 1991, at 7.
198. Uhaz No. 289, Dec. 19, 1991, Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 52, item 1902 (1991),
translated in Yel'tsin Decree of Security, Internal Ministry, FBIS-SOV-91-245, Dec. 20,

1991.
199. IzvEsnA, Dec. 31, 1991, at 4; Russian State Security Employees Against Merger with
Internal Affairs, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 3, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWP File.
200. SovETsKAiA RossIA, Dec. 27, 1991; ConstitutionalCourt Pledges to Thwart Dictatorship, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS Jan. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BBCSWP File [hereinafter Court Pledges]; Violation of the Constitution Charged,
FBIS-SOV-91-249, Dec. 27, 1991.
201. IZVESTIA, Dec. 31, 1991, at 4; Barannikov Interviewed on composition of New Ministry, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, BBCSWP File.
202. According to art. 59 (1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court any deputy to

the Supreme Soviet may petition the Court to examine the constitutionality of a legal
enactment. In an interview with Moscow News, Jan. 29, 1992, Chairman Zor'kin stated
that five Supreme Soviet commission chairmen and a sizeable number of deputies

had petitioned the Court. Vladimir Orlov, The PresidentHas His Mandate, Not an Indulgence, Moscow NEWS, Feb. 2-9, 1992, at 16, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, Mosnws
File (interview with Valery Zor'kin).

203. Court Pledges, supra note 200.
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On January 14, 1992, after an eight-hour public hearing and twohour in camera deliberations, the thirteen judges of the Russian Constitutional Court unanimously pronounced President Yel'tsin's decree and
all appointments made in its execution null and void. 20 4 In its public
session, the Court heard testimony of witnesses from the Ministry of
Security and Internal Affairs as well as from experts on constitutional
law. M. Mitiukov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee for Legislation, argued the constitutional complaint; Deputy Prime Minister
Shakhrai, State Councillor for Legal Policy, defended it on behalf of
President Yel'tsin. In its orally delivered opinion, the Court considered
the President's ukazy unconstitutional "from the point of view of the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers established in the
Russian Federation as well as of the demarcation of competencies
between the highest organs of state power and administration of the
RSFSR as enshrined in the Constitution of the RSFSR." 20 5 The Court
thus quoted two of the standards expressly formulated in article 58, part
two, points five and six of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the
USSR.
Six typewritten pages of legal reasoning specifically addressing
points of the Russian Constitution, Supreme Soviet legislation, and the
November 1 resolutions of the Congress of People's Deputies accompanied the Court's decision. Articles 89 and 90 of the Russian Constitution, the Court reasoned, allow soviets of people's deputies to establish
executive organs. Thus, ministries of the RSFSR may be established by
the Supreme Soviet (article 109), and by the Congress (article 104, part
two), the highest organ of state power. The Constitution does not permit the President to establish ministries (article 121.5).
The Congressional resolutions of November 1 granted special powers to the President, but only for a limited function and a limited time.
The resolutions also imposed a parliamentary control mechanism over
draft decrees that changed existing legislation, thus observing article
121.8 of the Constitution (ukazy of the President must not contradict the
Constitution and laws of the RSFSR) and maintaining the constitutional
system of checks and balances. The respective congressional resolutions neither amended the Constitution nor detracted from the constitutional powers of the Congress or the Supreme Soviet. The latter's
resolution of December 26 directly expresses the will of the Supreme
Soviet to exercise its powers in this sphere.
204. See IZVEsTIIA, Jan. 15, 1992, at 1, translated in Court Proceedings Over Yel'tsin
Decree Detailed, FBIS-SOV-92-015, Jan. 23, 1992 [hereinafter Court Proceedings]. I am

grateful to Professor Herman Schwartz of American University Law School, Washington, D.C., for an advance copy of the Constitutional Court's full opinion (postanovienie) as well as the appended-substantial but largely identical-concurring
opinion (osoboe mrenie) ofjudge E.M. Ametistov. The holding was to be published in

the Russian Legal Gazette, Vedomosti RSFSR, No. 6, item 247 (1992), and in all other
print media in which the presidential ukazy had appeared. Russian Law on the Consti-

tutional Court, supra note 181, art. 84.
205. Court Proceedings, supra note 204.
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The Constitutional Court further emphasized that the presidential
decree of November 19 also affects the constitutional protection of civil
and human rights and freedoms, which must not be regulated without
participation of the highest organs of state power (article 109, point
nine, of the Russian Constitution). The separation of state security and
police forces protects constitutional democratic structures and prevents
the usurpation of power. According to the Court, the presidential ukaz
violated a number of laws that establish checks and balances to safeguard these goals. One such legal provision is point two of the Supreme
Soviet resolution of April 18, 1991, No. 1027-I, On Putting into Effect
the RSFSR Law on the Police [Militsiia], which divides the police force
into smaller units and transfers many functions of the Ministry of the
Interior to other organs. The ukaz also violated article eighteen of the
Law on the State of Emergency of May 17, which permits the combination of those forces only under the special conditions of a state of emergency imposed by the Supreme Soviet. The ukaz further contradicted

the Law on Security of the RSFSR adopted by the Supreme Soviet in a
first reading on December 18, 1991, which basically considered the
merger of security forces inadmissible.
On January 16, Constitutional Court Chairman Zor'kin addressed
the Russian Supreme Soviet and emphasized that the decision of the
Constitutional Court repealing the President's decree was definitive and
not appealable, having come into force immediately after being proclaimed. He strongly criticized subsequent statements of Deputy Prime
Minister Shakhrai to the effect that the decree had not ceased to be
effective and that the Constitutional Court had issued a political rather
than legal decision. Zor'kin added that in the absence of an official
retraction the Court would consider the initiation of impeachment procedures against Shakhrai. 20 6 Shakrai immediately rose to defend himself before the Supreme Soviet. He argued that the complexity of the
issue permitted different viewpoints, and noting that President Yel'tsin
had already endorsed appropriate measures, 20 7 promised full compliance with the Court decision. He did not withdraw his critical comments.
On January 17, 1992, President Yel'tsin cancelled his decree and
restored the two separate Ministries. 20 8
Conclusion
Although it seems too early to draw broad conclusions from the first
decision of the Russian Constitutional Court, one may observe with satisfaction that this decision exhibited a higher level of legal craftsmanship
and substantive legal reasoning than the findings of the CCS. The Rus206. IZVESTIIA, Jan. 17, 1992, at 2; Shakhray Threatened with Impeachment Defends His
Position, BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Jan. 18, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BBCSWP File [hereinafter Shakhray Threatened].
207. IzvESTnA, Jan. 17, 1992, at 2; Shakhray Threatened, supra note 206.
208. IzVEsTIIA, Jan. 18, 1992, at 2.
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sian Court made a forceful statement of future intentions insofar as it
clearly demonstrated courage and determination in establishing and
defending a concept of rule of law that many Soviet observers had found
lacking in the work of its forerunner, the Committee of Constitutional
Supervision of the USSR. The Constitutional Court was not afraid to
address a major constitutional and political issue, and it thus may be
expected to confront the legislative and executive powers in the future
in order to affirm the authority of law and constitutional government.
It is hoped that the Court will lead in building a legal culture in the
country by collaborating with legal scholars who are willing and able to
offer advice and constructive criticism to develop constitutional theory.
The Court may be more productive than the former CCS, and it may
ensure more publicity for its decisions and engage in a more fruitful
interaction with the legal community. It should certainly not be a prime
function of the Court to lobby politicians or educate the public at large.
These tasks will have to be assumed by Russian law professors and their
contacts in the media. It would, however, seem entirely appropriate for
judges of the Constitutional Court to write law review articles and make
scholarly contributions to authoritative commentaries on constitutional
law.

Yet the basic vehicle of the Court's constitutional theory should
undoubtedly be individual decisions of the Court in specific cases and
controversies. Carefully crafted opinions and dissents may function as
eminently valuable teaching tools, demonstrating the road to legality by
means of explicit, well-reasoned argument that is not only logically compelling but also persuasively grounded in the substantive values of the
Russian Constitution. The Court would be well advised to avoid the
terse authoritative style of CCS findings, which may, partly because of
this style, have failed to accomplish a most important educational mission. Brevity and lack of argument may have a place in a highly developed legal system (like the ancient Roman or the modem French) where
experts write for experts in a kind of legal shorthand that is both under-

standable and acceptable in view of a massive and familiar body of doctrine standing behind it. In a developing legal system like the Russian,
however, the supreme guardians of the law must enter into a creative
dialogue with the academic establishment as well as with the legal profession at large in order to win their respect and support in developing
the sophisticated legal culture of a civilized society.

